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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: DIA COMMONWEALTH INTSUM 90-97/16 APR 97
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RUSSIA: IMPACT OF REVENUE SHORTFALLS (U)
UKRAINE: IMPACT OF PAY PROBLEMS (U)
GREECE: POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY PLANS (U)
IRAN: NAVAL ACTIVITY (U)
SUDAN: SITUATION IN THE SOUTH (U)
BURUNDI: SITUATION IN THE SOUTH (U)
ZAIRE: SITUATION UPDATE (U)
COLUMBIA: CONVIVIR DEVELOPMENTS (U)
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FEATURES

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RUSSIA: IMPACT OF REVENUE SHORTFALLS (U)
AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. (U) FIRST QUARTER TAX REVENUE SHORTFALLS WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE SOCIAL PROTECTION ISSUES.
2. (U) DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER CHUBAYS WILL REPORT TO THE DUMA ON 23 APRIL THAT FIRST QUARTER TAX COLLECTION ACQUIRED ONLY ABOUT 58 PERCENT OF PROJECTED REVENUES. BY LAW, THE DUMA MUST CUT SPENDING WHEN THIS SHORTFALL EXCEEDS 10 PERCENT OF PLANNED INCOME, THE GOVERNMENT PROBABLY WILL SUBMIT LEGISLATION FOR BUDGET SEQUESTRATION IN PRINCIPLE, THE DUMA CAN ACCESS ONLY UNPROTECTED BUDGET ITEMS AND CANNOT TOUCH CERTAIN ELEMENTS, SUCH AS PAY FOR PUBLIC WORKERS, TRANSFERS TO PENSION FUNDS, AND MEDICAL CARE. HOWEVER, DUMA MEMBERS

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WARNED THAT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE REVENUE SHORTFALL MEANS THAT FULL FUNDING OF ALL PROTECTED ITEMS WILL RESULT IN NO FUNDING FOR ANY UNPROTECTED AREA. THUS, A WHOLE NEW BUDGET BECOMES A POSSIBILITY.

3. (U) DESPITE THE REVENUE SHORTFALL, THE KREMLIN CONTINUES STOP- GAP MEASURES TO RESOLVE THE WAGE ARREARS ISSUE. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NEMTSOV SIGNED A 14 APRIL PROTOCOL ORDERING 500 BILLION RUBLES IN BACK PAY BE SENT TO THE NUCLEAR ENERGY SECTOR. HE ALSO ORDERED FUNDING FOR THE ATOMIC ENERGY MINISTRY'S RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AS WELL AS SUBSIDIES TO ITS "CLOSED" OR SECRET CITIES.

4. (C) HOW MOSCOW HANDLES THE ISSUE OF BUDGET SEQUESTRATION IS A CRITICAL TEST FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S NEW GOVERNMENT. IN PAST YEARS, THE KREMLIN HAS NOT EXEMPTED THOSE ITEMS THAT LEGISLATION SUPPOSEDLY SHIELDED. UNDOUBTEDLY, THE CHUBAYS-NEMTSOV TEAM WILL RECOMMEND DEEP CUTS IN THIS YEAR'S FUNDING OF UNPROTECTED ITEMS, SUCH AS MILITARY TRAINING. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT MAY TRY TO CURTAIL PUBLIC DISCONTENT BY CONTINUING PARTIAL PAYMENT OF WAGE ARREARS, ONLY VASTLY IMPROVED TAX COLLECTION WILL FORESTALL THE DE FACTO -- IF NOT DE JURE -- SEQUESTRATION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION FUNDS.


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UKRAINE: IMPACT OF PAY PROBLEMS (U)
AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. (U) MILITARY PAY PROBLEMS ARE TEMPTING MANY OFFICERS TO LEAVE MILITARY SERVICE.
2. (C) ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT PERSONNEL WERE LAST PAID ON 31 JANUARY. SALARY PAYMENTS REPORTEDLY ARE 6 MONTHS IN ARREARS FOR MOST SERVICEMEMBERS. JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO POSSESS MARKETABLE COMMERCIAL SKILLS, SUCH AS COMPUTER EXPERTISE OR COMMAND OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, ARE RAPIDLY LEAVING THE MILITARY AND JOINING THE CIVILIAN SECTOR. FURTHER MANNING PROBLEMS WERE REVEALED WHEN A DEFENSE MINISTRY SPOKESMAN REPORTED THAT ONLY 40 PERCENT OF THE DRAFTEES WANT TO SERVE IN THE ARMED FORCES.
3. (C) DESPITE THE LACK OF PAY, FOOD PARCELS REGULARLY ARE DISTRIBUTED TO MILITARY MEMBERS. ALTHOUGH THE RATIONS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT FOR ONE ADULT, THE QUANTITY AND VARIETY IS NOT ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN A MILITARY FAMILY. A MILITARY FAMILY OF THREE RECEIVES 4 KG OF MEAT, ASSORTED QUANTITIES OF CHEESES, POTATOES, AND 3 LITERS OF MILK A MONTH.
4. (C) MILITARY PERSONNEL MOST LIKELY WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT TO TRY TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR MEAGER WAGES, WITH AN INCREASING NUMBER TURNING TO ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN ORDER TO EARN QUICK "EASY" MONEY. THOSE OFFICERS WHO WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE THE MILITARY FOR A LUCRATIVE CIVILIAN JOB OFTEN FIND THEY LACK THE REQUISITE SKILLS AND EXPERIENCE FOR A RAPID SUCCESS IN ADDITION TO THE FUNDS FOR SUCH A TRANSITION.
5. (C) DESPITE THESE PROBLEMS, A NUMBER OF UNITS HAVE BEEN TARGETED FOR INCREASED READINESS AND RECEIVE PRIORITY FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES; THESE FORCES INCLUDE AIRMOBILE UNITS AND UNITS IN

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THE CRIMEA. HOWEVER, UNTIL KIEV FINDS THE NECESSARY FUNDS TO PROVIDE

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FOR ALL ITS SERVICEMEMBERS, OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITIES WILL LANGUISH AS FINDING QUALITY REPLACEMENTS FOR THE INCREASING NUMBER OF PERSONNEL LEAVING THE SERVICE BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT.

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GREECE: POSSIBLE CONTINGENCY PLANS (U)
AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. ~~(S)~~ GREECE REPORTEDLY PLANS A PROPORTIONAL MILITARY RESPONSE AGAINST A TURKISH MAINLAND TARGET IF TURKEY ATTACKS CYPRIOT S-300 (SA-10/GRUMBLE) MISSILES.
2. ~~(S)~~ DESPITE THE RISKS, ATHENS BELIEVES THE JOINT DEFENSE DOCTRINE AGREEMENT WITH CYPRUS OBLIGES GREECE TO TAKE SOME MILITARY ACTION IF TURKEY ATTACKS. ATHENS BELIEVES THAT A FAILURE TO RESPOND, OR A WEAK RESPONSE, WOULD EMBOLDEN THE TURKS EVEN FURTHER, LEADING TO A MORE AGGR?SSIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD GREECE. A GREEK MILITARY RESPONSE ON CYPRUS REPORTEDLY WAS RULED OUT FOR TWO REASONS: ADEQUATE FORCES ARE UNAVAILABLE FOR STAGING A RETALIATORY STRIKE, AND A STRIKE ON THE S-300S WOULD BE MADE BY ANKARA, SO THE RESPONSE SHOULD BE IN TURKEY, NOT CYPRUS. GREEK MILITARY OPTIONS RANGE FROM SMALL-SCALE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIONS TO LARGE-SCALE AIRSTRIKES AGAINST COASTAL TARGETS.

GROUND OPERATIONS IN THRACE APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY OPTION THE GREEKS RULED OUT.

3. ~~(S)~~ THE PROSPECT OF GREECE RISKING WAR WITH TURKEY REGARDING THE S-300 MISSILES ON CYPRUS IS DOUBTFUL. ATHENS' RESPONSE TO ANKARA'S INTERVENTION IN 1974 WAS MINIMAL. ANY ATTACK AGAINST TARGETS IN TURKEY WOULD SURELY ESCALATE INTO A MUCH BROADER CONFLICT, AND GREEK INTENTIONS TO LIMIT ACTION TO A QUICK SURGICAL STRIKE ARE UNREALISTIC. ATHENS COULD SUFFER THE LOSS OF SOME ISLANDS OR EVEN PORTIONS OF THRACE BECAUSE OF ANKARA'S RESPONSE GIVEN THE RISKS, ATHENS PROBABLY IS THREATENING A WIDER CONFLICT TO DETER A TURKISH ATTACK AGAINST THE S-300S IN THE HOPE THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WILL BE PLACED ON THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF.


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IRAN: NAVAL ACTIVITY (U)
AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. ~~(S)~~ IN UNPRECEDENTED NAVAL ACTIVITY, IRAN COLLOCATED ALL 10 C-802/SACCADE-EQUIPPED HOUDONG PATROL BOATS AT BANDAR-E ABBAS.
2. ~~(S)~~ THE FIVE HOUDONG'S, WHICH ARE NORMALLY AT BUSHEHR HALILEH, ARRIVED AT BANDAR-E ABBAS BY 14 APRIL, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER AT THE FACILITY TO 10. MOREOVER, THE BUSHEHR-BASED HOUDONG'S WERE LOADED WITH FOUR C-802 ANTISHIP MISSILE CANISTERS EACH BEFORE DEPARTURE, SUGGESTING THESE UNITS WILL PARTICIPATE IN EXERCISE- RELATED ACTIVITY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THESE UNITS WERE FULLY UPLOADED WITH MISSILE CANISTERS SINCE 18 JANUARY.

3. ~~(S)~~ THESE UNITS MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE UPCOMING ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC) EXERCISE ASHURA II AND TARIQ AL QODS, WHICH IS CENTERED AROUND QESHM ISLAND AND SCHEDULED TO START NEXT WEEK. ALTERNATELY, ALTHOUGH IRGC NAVAL ASSETS WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE UPCOMING FATEH NAVAL

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EXERCISE, THAT POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THE 14 APRIL ARRIVAL AT BANDAR-E ABBAS COINCIDES WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL FATEH PARTICIPANTS FROM BUSHEHR ARRIVE BY THE 16TH. IN POSSIBLY RELATED ACTIVITY, SUBSEQUENT TO THE HOUDONG'S ARRIVAL IN BANDAR-E ABBAS, THE START DATE FOR FATEH WAS MOVED FROM 18 TO 24 APRIL.

4. ~~(TS)~~ (b) THIS IS THE FIRST TIME ALL 10 IRANIAN HOUDONG'S HAVE BEEN AT BANDAR-E ABBAS. ALTHOUGH THE DEPLOYMENT IS UNUSUAL, IT PROBABLY IS EXERCISE-RELATED AND IS LIKELY TO BE OF LIMITED DURATION. ALTHOUGH BOTH EXERCISES ARE NOT SCHEDULED TO BEGIN UNTIL NEXT WEEK, THE HOUDONGS PROBABLY WILL REMAIN IN BANDAR-E ABBAS UNTIL EXERCISE ACTIVITY IS CONCLUDED. FOLLOWING THAT, THE BUSHEHR-BASED UNITS WILL RETURN TO BUSHEHR HALILEH.

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SUDAN: SITUATION IN THE SOUTH (U)

AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. ~~(TS)~~ (b) SOUTHERN REBELS OPENED ANOTHER AXIS OF ADVANCE ON JUBA EAST OF THE NILE.

2. ~~(TS)~~ ON 9 APRIL, UGANDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCE (UPDF) AND SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA) FORCES MOVING FROM MAGWE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 *****/

ATTACKED A UGANDAN REBEL LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA) HEADQUARTERS AT "ARUK JUNCTION," PROBABLY JUST WEST OF TORIT. THE UPDF INCURRED 9 KILLED AND 15 WOUNDED IN THE FIGHTING; THE LRA AND SUDANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES (SPAF) HAD ABOUT 100 CASUALTIES. LATE ON THE 9TH, THE UPDF ALSO INTERCEPTED SOME 200 LRA AND SPAF TROOPS FLEEING TOWARD JUBA. IN ADDITION, THE UPDF REPORTEDLY TOOK TIRANGOLE, ABOUT 30 KM EAST OF TORIT, FROM A BATTALION OF LRA AND SPAF DEFENDERS, DESTROYING THREE TANKS AND DAMAGING ANOTHER. BY THE 11TH, THE UPDF MOVED A BATTALION, PROBABLY FROM THE FIGHTING AROUND TORIT, WEST TO A BLOCKING POSITION NORTH OF KIT. THE SPAF SENT A FORCE TO DISLodge THE UGANDANS. THIS WAS UNSUCCESSFUL, AND THE UPDF CAPTURED THREE SUDANESE TANKS INTACT WHILE INCURRING ONE SOLDIER KILLED AND SIX WOUNDED. BY THE 14TH, SPLA FORCES FROM SOUTH OF KIT ATTACKED AND, PROBABLY IN COORDINATION WITH THE BLOCKING FORCE, DEFEATED THE SUDANESE THE SPAF REPORTEDLY SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES INCLUDING TANKS AND ARTILLERY.

3. ~~(TS)~~ (b) NO FURTHER PROGRESS HAS BEEN REPORTED WEST OF THE NILE. DESPITE SPLA LEADER GARANG'S CLAIMS TO BE WITHIN ARTILLERY RANGE OF JUBA ON ALL THREE AXES OF ADVANCE, THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE CASE. HE MAY HAVE UP TO 130-MM ARTILLERY WITH HIS FORCES, BUT ITS 27-KM RANGE IS INADEQUATE TO REACH JUBA FROM ANY OF THE SPLA POSITIONS. MOREOVER, THE RECENT FIGHTING, SOME 90 KM INSIDE SUDAN, IS THE DEEPEST PENETRATION OF UGANDAN UNITS REPORTED. KAMPALA IS UNLIKELY TO PUSH ITS FORCES ON TOWARD JUBA BUT BELIEVED THAT DESTROYING AN LRA HEADQUARTERS AND BREACHING THE KIT RIVER LINE WARRANTED THE INCURSION. NONETHELESS, NO GREAT OBSTACLE IMPEDES THE SPLA'S ADVANCE EAST OF THE NILE TO WITHIN ABOUT 25 KM OF JUBA.

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BURUNDI: SITUATION IN THE SOUTH (U)

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AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. (U) FIGHTING INCREASED IN THE SOUTH.
2. ~~(S)~~ THE BURUNDIAN ARMED FORCES (FAB) REPORTEDLY KILLED 140 FRONT FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY (FDD) REBELS LAST WEEK IN SOUTHERNMOST MAKAMBA PROVINCE. THE GOVERNMENT ADMITTED INCURRING NINE CASUALTIES, THREE KILLED AND 6 WOUNDED. IN THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL, THE FAB SUFFERED AT LEAST 5 KILLED AND 12 WOUNDED IN INCIDENTS IN PROVINCES BORDERING LAKE TANGANYIKA SOUTH OF BUJUMBURA. THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED THAT MORE THAN 600 FDD REBELS, AND POSSIBLY SOME FROM OTHER REBEL GROUPS, INFILTRATED FROM TANZANIA ALONG THE LAKE FROM RUMONGE TO NYANZA-LAC EARLY IN APRIL.
3. ~~(S)~~ "REBEL" CASUALTY FIGURES MAY BE CORRECT. HOWEVER, MANY OF THE VICTIMS MOST LIKELY WERE HUTU CIVILIANS CAUGHT IN A CROSSFIRE OR KILLED BY THE PREDOMINATELY TUTSI FAB FOR "COLLABORATION" WITH HUTU REBELS. GOVERNMENT FIGURES FOR REBEL INFILTRATION PROBABLY WERE EXAGGERATED TO HELP JUSTIFY HIGH REBEL CASUALTY FIGURES.
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ZAIRE: SITUATION UPDATE (U)

AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. (U) KINSHASA GENERALLY WAS CALM ON 15 APRIL; STUDENT PROTESTS CALLING FOR PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO STEP DOWN FAILED TO MATERIALIZE.
2. ~~(S)~~ SECURITY FORCES BLOCKED TWO MAIN ACCESS ROADS TO UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES AND STOPPED STUDENTS FROM RALLYING. DEMONSTRATORS TRIED TO SET UP BARRICADES IN THE MATETE DISTRICT, A STRONGHOLD OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER TSHISEKEDI, BUT GENDARMES MOVED IN QUICKLY TO REMOVE THEM AND MAKE ARRESTS. MORE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY WAS NOTED ON 15 APRIL THAN ON THE 14TH, BUT MANY STORES REMAINED CLOSED. BECAUSE STUDENTS PLANNED TO STEAL VEHICLES TO CONDUCT THE PROTEST, MOST STREETS WERE DEVOID OF TRAFFIC IN THE EARLY PART OF THE DAY. SECURITY FORCE EFFECTIVENESS AND THE FACT THAT MOST KINSHASANS CANNOT AFFORD TO MISS WORK PROBABLY MEANS THAT THE GENERAL STRIKES AND PROTEST PLANS WILL SOON END.
3. ~~(S)~~ REBEL LEADER KABILA ARRIVED IN LUBUMBASHI ON 14 APRIL, LESS THAN A WEEK AFTER HIS ALLIANCE FORCES CAPTURED THE TOWN. AS OF MIDDAY ON THE 15TH, HOWEVER, KABILA HAD YET TO APPEAR IN PUBLIC. HE EARLIER APPOINTED GAETAN KAKUDJI GOVERNOR OF SHABA REGION, A MOVE THAT COULD CAUSE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. KAKUDJI IS KABILA'S NEPHEW AND A NATIVE

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 *****/

SHABAN, BUT HE ALLEGEDLY HAS BEEN IN EXILE FOR 30 YEARS. SEVERAL HUNDRED SUPPORTERS OF MOBUTU-APPOINTED GOVERNOR KYUNGU STAGED A PROTEST, AN UNUSUAL EVENT IN NEWLY CAPTURED TERRITORY. KYUNGU SUPPORTERS BELIEVE HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN RETAINED AS GOVERNOR OR THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD IMMEDIATELY. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT SAID THAT THE REBELS HAD PLACED KYUNGU UNDER HOUSE ARREST ON THE 15TH. KYUNGU IS POPULAR IN SHABA AND IF HIS ARREST IS CONFIRMED IT MAY DEPRIVE KABILA OF SOME SUPPORT.

4. ~~(S)~~ FORMER PRIME MINISTER KENGO AND HIS FAMILY "FLED" ZAIRE ON 13 APRIL. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED AN INTERNATIONAL ARREST WARRANT FOR KENGO, BELIEVING HIM TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ZAIRE'S EMPTY DEFENSE

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FUND. THESE REPORTS REMAIN UNCONFIRMED, BUT FOLLOWING KENGO'S RESIGNATION A FEW WEEKS AGO, HIS GOVERNMENT WAS RUMORED TO HAVE DRAWN \$12-\$15 MILLION FROM A LINE OF CREDIT WITH A BELGIAN BANK WITH WHICH KENGO HAS CLOSE TIES.

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COLUMBIA: CONVIVIR DEVELOPMENTS (U)
AS OF 2200Z 15 APR 97

1. ~~(S)~~ SENIOR OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY USED THE RURAL SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE (CONVIVIR) PROGRAM TO ASSIST DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND POSSIBLY ILLEGAL PARAMILITARIES.
2. ~~(S)~~ FORMER SUPERINTENDENT OF VIGILANCE AND SECURITY (SVSP) ARIAS USED HIS POSITION AS CONVIVIR ADMINISTRATOR TO ISSUE CONVIVIR AND PRIVATE SECURITY LICENSES AS WELL AS RESTRICTED HEAVY-WEAPON PERMITS TO INDIVIDUALS WITH KNOWN DRUG TRAFFICKING LINKS. FURTHERMORE, ARIAS' FATHER WAS INVOLVED IN FORMING PARAMILITARY GROUPS, AND HIS BROTHER IS A SECURITY COMPANY OWNER WITH PROBABLE DRUG TIES.
3. ~~(S)~~ A DEFENSE MINISTRY INVESTIGATION REVEALED SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES WITHIN THE SVSP UNDER ARIAS'. HOWEVER, ARIAS RECENTLY WAS PROMOTED TO BOGOTA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER POSITION.
4. ~~(S)~~ THE CONVIVIR PROGRAM, SINCE ITS CREATION IN 1995, HAS GROWN TO ABOUT 15,000 MEMBERS. IT ENJOYS POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM COLOMBIANS SEEKING TO FIGHT BACK AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS. THE GROUPS OPERATE NATIONWIDE BUT ARE MOST NUMEROUS IN THE NORTHWEST, WHERE GUERRILLAS AND ILLEGAL PARAMILITARIES BATTLE A BLOODY TURF WAR. CONVIVIR'S STATED MISSION IS TO PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE ON INSURGENTS TO THE MILITARY AND COMMUNITY SELF DEFENSE UNITS.
5. ~~(S)~~ ALTHOUGH NOT ALL CONVIVIRS ARE ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, REVELATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES WILL DAMAGE CONVIVIR'S CREDIBILITY AND MAY CONFIRM NGO FEARS THAT ILLEGAL PARAMILITARIES WILL COOPT THE CONVIVIR. BOGOTA MAY BE TRYING TO PREEMPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EMERGING SCANDAL BY MOVING ARIAS TO A POSITION DISTANT FROM CONVIVIR MANAGEMENT AND PLEDGING TIGHT REGULATION OF THE CONVIVIR. BOGOTA FAILED TO ACT ON A SIMILAR PLEDGE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ILLEGAL PARAMILITARIES, AND THUS THE RESOLVE TO CLEAN UP THE LEGAL CONVIVIRS IS DOUBTFUL.

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